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Summary: The main goal of this paper is to test the convergence of social protection 
expenditures and, more specifically, to examine the incidence of the Maastricht Treaty 
on this process. We tested several hypotheses of convergence on 12 EU Member States 
between 1980 and 2000, by considering two indicators: social protection expenditure as 
percentage of GDP and social protection expenditure per capita. The cross sectional tests 
of σ  and β−convergence show that, for the two indicators, these two assumptions are 
checked for the whole of the period. On the other hand, the period division in two sub- 
periods intended to locate the Maastricht effect indicates a rupture since 1993. Then, 
panel data estimations of conditional β-convergence confirm the existence of a process 
of conditional convergence and reveal the significant role of the debt criterion of Maas-
tricht. The coexistence of absolute and conditional β-convergence is not incompatible. It 
evokes the possible idea of a European “Social Snake” rather than of a single Social 
Model. 
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Introduction 
 
The European Construction has been based on the choice of a model of market 
integration letting the social dimensions lag behind. According to the founding 
fathers of the EEC, economic integration would promote progress in social pro-
tection across participating countries and such social progress would more or 
less spontaneously follow economic progress. Social protection systems fully 
remain in the realm of national sovereignty according to the subsidiarity princi-
ple.  
Beginning in the eighties, the majority of EU countries have been facing 
similar challenges (weak growth, unemployment, aging population) enhancing 
the demand for social transfers while at the same time external pressures have 
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reduced policy makers’ room to maneuver. Globalization has been increasing 
economic and tax competition. In the same way, the Maastricht Treaty and the 
Stability and Growth Pact require drastic reduction in government deficits and 
the public debt. All in all, these challenges raise the question of the viability of 
heterogeneous social protection systems in such a context grounded on fears of a 
convergence towards the bottom of welfare provision. However, the design of 
social protection has witnessed changes in recent years. Rather than being exclu-
sively regarded as production costs, social protection now seems to be consid-
ered as a possible lever at the service of European unification.  Indeed, since the 
Summit of Lisbon (2000), the Member States are committed to applying the 
"Open Method of Coordination" to social policy. However, in contrast to the 
PSG, this policy instrument does not offer the option of sanctions; besides, the 
subsidiarity principle is completely preserved. However, if this principle sug-
gests the maintenance of some diversity among European welfare states, the 
common challenges and constraints that EU countries are facing raise the issue 
of similar features in the future paths of social protection expenditure. In the 
context of these policies and trends, the main goal of this paper is to empirically 
address the impact of European policy integration on social protection expendi-
tures of the 12 EU countries over the period 1980-2000. More precisely, we ex-
amine the issue of whether the conditions for single currency settings affect the 
dynamics and speed of convergence of social protection systems. Although some 
recent studies give evidence as to the convergence of social protection expendi-
ture among EU countries, to our best knowledge, none of them have included 
variables relating to Maastricht as conditioning factors in order to tackle the im-
pact of the European integration policy.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 exposes briefly the conver-
gence concepts issued from growth empirics (applied to the area of social pro-
tection expenditure) and then reviews the empirical evidence on social conver-
gence from recent studies. Section 3 presents evidence on the two concepts of 
convergence. More specifically, hypotheses of σ and β are first tested using 
cross-sectional regressions. Then, a more rigorous test is performed by moving 
to the concept of conditional β-convergence and panel data techniques in order 
to identify a possible Maastricht effect. Concluding comments are then given in 
section 4. 
 
 
1. Concepts of σ and β Convergence and Review of Findings on Social Con-
vergence 
 
Some recent works adapt the empirical methods of the literature on economic 
growth to analyze the degree of convergence of social protection expenditures.  Social Protection Convergence in the European Union: Impact of Maastricht Treaty 
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1.1. Hypotheses of Convergence 
 
They use the two concepts of convergence resulting from growth empirics.  
The first one, known as σ-convergence seeks to study whether the dis-
persion of per-capita income is reduced over time. Thus, convergence exists if 
the standard deviation or the coefficient of variation of social protection expen-
ditures across a group of countries tends to decrease significantly over time.  In-
dexing by t0 the initial date and by T the final date of reference under the period 
considered, the Fisher statistics can be used to test the null hypothesis (H0: σ 
2
t0
 
= σ 
2
T) against the alternative hypothesis (H1: σ 
2
t0
 > σ 
2
T) at a given level of sig-
nificance. 
The second design corresponds to the concept of β-convergence (Barro 
and Sala-I-Martin, 1996). It attempts to evaluate whether the standards of living 
of the various economies tend to approach each other over time in order to high-
light the tendency of a poor economy to grow at a faster rate than a rich one. 
Applied to social protection, this design, often called "regression towards the 
mean" (Barro and Salt-I-Martin, 1996), is based on the estimation of the follow-
ing model:  
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Where the left-hand side is the average annual growth rate of social pro-
tection expenditure in country i at time T, (a) is a constant term and ε is the error 
term. The parameter β is a measure of β-convergence. A mechanism of β-
convergence is observed when there is a significant and negative relation (β < 0) 
between the initial level of the variable and its annual growth rate. If this as-
sumption is checked for welfare expenditures, then it would indicate that coun-
tries with initially low levels of SP expenditure would experience faster SP ex-
penditure growth than countries whose levels of expenditures have reached a 
certain stage of maturity. It follows that, regardless of their economic, social and 
institutional specificities, all countries in the sample converge to the same steady 
state
1. 
To supplement these studies, the assumption of conditional β-
convergence induced from the endogenous growth literature was tested. This 
concept analyzes the convergence of each country towards its own steady state; 
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It makes it possible to derive the number of years (T-half) it would take for one-half of social ex-
penditure differences between member countries to come up to the EU average. Nicole Attia and Valérie Berenger 
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it suggests that convergence depends on the structural characteristics of each 
economy, and these structural differences imply that different countries will 
have different steady states relative to per capita income. In this case, the coun-
tries will converge all the more quickly as they are distant from their long term 
steady state.   
The convergence equation, in its more general form, can assume the fol-
lowing specification: 
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Where yit represents social protection expenditure (as a percentage of 
GDP or per capita) in country i at time t and variables xk designate a set of fac-
tors affecting the growth rate of social expenditure and controlling (for) the 
steady-state. Lastly, Di is a set of dummy variables, one for each country, 
i=1…N
2, which are included as shift parameters. Thus, coefficients (ai) indicate 
the specific characteristics of each country; they allow for diversity in steady 
states resulting from the structural differences between countries.  
Convergence is thus conditional if the factors introduced in the equation 
have a significant influence and if there is a positive relation between the growth 
rate of the welfare expenditures and the distance which separate them from their 
steady state.  
 
 
1.2. Empirical Review on Convergence of Social Expenditure 
 
Alonso et al. (1998) were the first to test the assumptions of σ and 
β−convergence in the field of social protection. Based on cross-sectional and 
panel data estimations for 11 countries of the UE over the period 1966-92, the 
authors show a certain degree of convergence of per capita social protection ex-
penditures for the two sub-periods 1966-74, 1978-86 and 1986-1992 and a proc-
ess of divergence for the remaining sub-period 1974-1978. In the majority of the 
studies which followed, β-convergence was primarily estimated using cross-
sectional data of social protection expenditures in their totality or by categories 
(Cornelisse and Goodswaard, 2002; Boeri, 2002). Among these studies, except 
for that of Wolf (2002), rare are those that tried to clarify the conditions of the 
catching-up process by testing the influence of other determinants acting on the 
dynamics of the social protection expenditures. These studies lead as a whole to 
similar results and give some evidence of the σ  and β−convergence processes. 
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The more recent studies aim at supplementing the estimates from cross-sectional 
data by panel data techniques in order to introduce heterogeneity into the speci-
fication of the equations of β-convergence. Thus, Püss et al. (2003) tested the 
convergence of the social protection expenditure per capita and as a percentage 
of GDP and by categories of expenditure using panel data of 15 UE-countries 
over the period 1993-2000. Their results confirm the assumptions of σ and abso-
lute β -convergence and show, at the same time, that the level of convergence is 
not homogeneous over the period being studied. The contribution of these au-
thors lies in the test of the conditional β-convergence which includes five factors 
which likely condition convergence. These factors take into account the eco-
nomic and socio-demographic characteristics of the countries considered but do 
not include the probable influence of the European integration policy on the dy-
namics of the welfare expenditures. These concepts are also estimated by Nixon 
(1999) in panel data to analyze the convergence of the healthcare systems. The 
author integrates only the level of GDP per capita as a control variable but takes 
the diversity of healthcare systems into account of. 
In the same line, Corrado et al. (2003) use fixed effects and composed 
coefficients models based on the inclusion of dummy variables to reflect the in-
teraction between country specific factors and welfare policies. They highlight 
the maintenance of a strong heterogeneity between the social protection systems 
and thus do not confirm convergence towards a single European social model.  
These results are deepened in a more recent study of Alsasua et al. (2007) which 
moderates the results of β-convergence by emphasizing the influence of eco-
nomic and demographic factors specific to each country in the persistence of 
variations in the level of per capita social protection expenditures within the 
European countries. Lastly, these same assumptions are also tested in other 
works tackling the more general question of the convergence of the structure of 
public expenditure (Ringe, 2004; Sanz, 2005 and Skidmore and al, 2004).  
However, to our knowledge, the majority of these studies primarily take 
into account only internal factors reflecting the economic and demographic 
situations of each country without integrating the influence of external factors 
such as the degree of openness and the nominal convergence criteria related to 
the European policy integration. In addition, none of these works clearly explain 
the adequacy between the results obtained from absolute convergence and condi-
tional convergence.  Nicole Attia and Valérie Berenger 
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2. Results for 12 UE-Members over the Period 1980-2000 
 
Following the same methodology, we propose widening the framework of the 
analysis, by increasing the degree of complexity of the estimate techniques, in 
order to integrate various variables likely to influence the speed of convergence 
of social protection expenditure, particularly those reflecting the degree of open-
ness and the constraints imposed by the construction of the UEM.  
The analysis focuses on two indicators of social protection expenditure: 
the social protection expenditure as a percentage of GDP (SPGDP) and per cap-
ita social expenditure (SPCAP), at PPS units and constant price (1985) both ex-
pressed in a logarithm, from a sample of 12 EU Member States
3 over the period 
1980-2000. The data for this study was obtained from various sources: the data 
relating to social protection expenditure and the demographic structure come 
from Eurostat, while the economic indicators are from the statistical appendices 
of the European Economy Review.  
These two indicators measure the level of social protection according to 
two different approaches: the first, (SPGDP), indicates the effort carried out by a 
country as regards social protection in terms of the share of the national wealth 
devoted to social protection; the second, (SPCAP), expressed at PPS and con-
stant price can be designated as an indicator of the level of well-being and pro-
tection of the inhabitants of a country. From this point of view, SPGDP can be 
interpreted as an indicator of means whereas SPCAP can be conceived as an in-
dicator of outcomes. These two indicators are obviously linked, but do not coin-
cide inevitably because their divergence can reveal the influence of the GDP per 
capita
4. 
Before the empirical check of the various hypotheses of convergence, a 
brief analysis of the evolution of their means is necessary. 
                                                 
3 Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, 
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Table 1.  Evolution of the mean of social protection expenditure in EU. 
Period 
Indicators  80  -  89  89  - 93  93  - 00 
SPGDP U  12 
22,5 → 23,3 
Rise (irregular 
tendency) 
23,3 → 27 
Strong rise 
27 → 24,9 
Decline 
 
SPCAP  
(index 100 for 1980)  U 12  100 → 123 
Rise 
123 → 147 
Strong rise 
147 → 169 
Rise 
 
As shown in table 1, it is possible to identify two turning points: one in 
1989 and the other in 1993. From 1989 on, the increase in social protection ex-
penditure (SPGDP and SPCAP) accelerates until 1993: from 23.3 % to 27 % for 
SPGDP, and from 123 to 147 for SPCAP. In 1993 and until 2000, SPGDP de-
creases to reach 24.9 % thus joining its 1991 level   whereas SPCAP continues 
to increase but more slowly. 
This descriptive analysis gives a first indication of a rupture in the evo-
lution of social protection expenditures in the EU. The date corresponds to the 
implementation of the Maastricht Treaty.  
 
 
2.1. Cross-Sectional Tests of σ-Convergence and Absolute β-Convergence 
 
Chart1 displays the trend of the coefficient of variation (CV=standardized stan-
dard deviation) over the period for the two indicators (SPGDP and SPCAP) ex-
pressed as a logarithm. Although the value of CV for SPGDP declined between 
1980 and 2000 from 11.52 to 6.72, its fall was not regular over the whole period. 
It is characterized by two periods of strong fall: 1980-1985 and 1989-1993 
which position the indicator with its minimum value in 1993. As of this date, the 
indicator started to ascend. The CV for SPCAP decreased slowly between 1980 
and 2000 from a value of 7.89 in 1980 to 4.06 in 2000. Nevertheless, it was 
marked by a stabilization of its value between 1990 and 1996 then it decreased 
again. 
The F-test results (F=2.94 with Pr=0 .04 for SPGDP and F=3.78 with 
Pr=0.02 for SPCAP) provide evidence to support the hypothesis of σ-
convergence for the two indicators over the whole period being examined. On 
the other hand, this hypothesis is rejected in both cases over the period 1993-
2000 (F=1.8 with Pr=0.83 for SPGDP and F=1.5 with Pr=0.25 for SPCAP). 
Lastly, by comparing the values of CV, one notes that SPGDP presents a greater 
dispersion than SPCAP. This difference can indicate different choices according 
to countries' as regards the allocation of GDP to social protection financing. Nicole Attia and Valérie Berenger 
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Chart 1. Coefficient of variation of SPGDP and SPCAP: 1980-2000 
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Having tested σ-convergence, the issue is now to consider whether the 
evolution of social protection expenditure reveals the existence of a catching-up 
phenomenon. Also, in order to identify the indirect effect of European integra-
tion policy initiated by the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty, model (1) is 
also estimated over sub-periods: 1980-1992 and 1993-2000 when 1993 corre-
sponds to the implementation of the Maastricht effect. Table 2 gives the OLS 
cross-sectional estimations of the relation (1) for SPGDP and SPCAP and the 12 
EU-countries being considered. With the exception of SPGDP over sub-period 
1993-00, the parameter estimates of β are negative and statistically significant. 
All in all, the results confirm the hypothesis of β-convergence of social protec-
tion expenditure (SPGDP and SPCAP) over the whole period with values of -
0.041 and -0.0237 respectively for the two indicators being considered. On the 
other hand, the results obtained over the two sub-periods give evidence that this 
process is neither continuous nor regular. 
Whereas the estimated coefficient (β ) has the expected sign for SPGDP, 
it admits a very low value and is no longer statistically significant after 1993 
suggesting that the very fast convergence which characterized the 1980-1992 
period seems to have stopped or slowed down considerably after 1993. All in all, 
the results corroborate those resulting from the test of the σ-convergence.  Social Protection Convergence in the European Union: Impact of Maastricht Treaty 
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Table 2. Tests of absolute β-convergence for SPGDP and SPCAP. 
SPGDP  SPCAP at PPS and constant price   
1980-00 1980-92 1993-00  1980-00  1980-92  1993-00 
Intercept 
 
 
β 
 
 
R
2 
0.131*** 
(0.027) 
 
-0.041***
(0.009) 
 
0.6775 
0.157*** 
(0.024) 
 
-0.047***
(0.008) 
 
0.782 
0.0126 
(0.109) 
 
-0.007 
(0.033) 
 
0.046 
0.210*** 
(0.028) 
 
-0.0237*** 
(0.004) 
 
0.7865 
0.232*** 
(0.035) 
 
-0.026*** 
(0.0045) 
 
0.7674 
0.220** 
(0.068) 
 
-0.025** 
(0.008) 
 
0.4664 
speed 0.0925  0.0726  na 0.0327  0.03213  0.0278 
T-half 7.5  3.5  na 
 
21.9 21.5  24 
The parameter β and the speed of convergence have been estimated by OLS and 
NLLS respectively. Standard errors are in brackets.  (***), (**) and (*) denote signifi-
cance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
The hypotheses of σ and β−convergence are obviously linked, but they 
are not identical. The β−convergence implies  forces tending to push the system 
back into equilibrium, namely, an  adjustment mechanism  of the economies to-
wards a long-term equilibrium. As is well-known, existence of β−convergence is 
a necessary but not a sufficient condition for σ-convergence
5. The indicator of 
well-being, SPCAP, exhibits a clear tendency to convergence, probably slowed 
down by the Maastricht Treaty, but continuous. With the exception of the sub-
period 1993-2000 which indicates that β -convergence is not sufficiently signifi-
cant to guarantee σ-convergence, there is evidence of σ and β−convergence pat-
terns for this indicator.  
On the other hand, the effort devoted by countries to social protection 
does not show the same characteristics: SPGDP tends to converge over the 
whole period: 1980-2000. However, the second sub-period (1993-2000) does not 
reveal any reduction in the dispersion of the SP expenditure: the hypothesis of 
σ and β−convergence cannot be retained.  
However, the very low value of R
2 reveals that the estimated model is 
not significant. In comparison, SPCAP converged significantly over all the peri-
ods but at a slower speed after 1993. In all cases, the quality of the adjustment is 
lower for sub-period 1993-2000 suggesting the need to take into account the in-
fluence of other factors on the growth rate of social protection expenditure. This 
implies that we move to a conditional β-convergence approach. 
 
 
                                                 
5  To note the existence of ￿convergence, it is necessary that the tendency expressed by 
￿convergence is sufficiently strong to dominate the effects of the shocks which occurred during 
the period. Nicole Attia and Valérie Berenger 
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2.2. Panel Data Estimates of Conditional β-Convergence: Impact of External 
Conditioning Factors of Convergence 
 
Cross-sectional estimates of absolute β-convergence have been criticized be-
cause they fail to take into account the heterogeneity of the countries being stud-
ied. They could lead to biased estimators of the rate of convergence. Also, Islam 
(1995) proposes to use panel techniques to analyze convergence. This frame-
work allows the controlling any unobservable time invariant country-specific 
determinants of growth. Moreover, in comparison with the above results, the 
small number of observations does not make it possible to include the factors 
influencing the growth of social protection expenditure other than the initial 
level of the expenditure. Although the fixed effects and random effects models 
are the two conventional procedures for panel data estimations, the fixed effects 
model is, in our study of particular interest because it makes it possible to con-
trol the unobservable determinants of the welfare expenditure growth that are 
specific to the countries and time invariant
6.    
In order to select the variables that could influence the growth rate of SP 
expenditures and social convergence, we refer to the existing literature dealing 
with the determinants of public and welfare expenditures. 
  Following Lindert (1996) and Alsasua et al. (2007), we include three 
kind of domestic factors. The first one corresponds to the economic growth rate 
(Δ GDP) as it determines the financial capacity of the system. The second is the 
rate of variation of the unemployment rate (ΔUNEM) which depends on the em-
ployment picture and conditions the demand for social security benefits. Lastly, 
the third one takes into account the socio-demographic characteristics repre-
sented by the lagged rate of variation of the dependency ratio (ΔRD(-1)). Ac-
cording to the literature, this variable should have a positive impact on the 
growth of the welfare expenditures because a rise in this ratio due to demo-
graphic aging increases the proportion of the voters demanding social transfers 
(Lindert, 1996).  
Moreover, among other factors affecting convergence, we consider ex-
ternal factors.  We propose including two variables reflecting international and 
European economic integration: the degree of openness (OPEN) and the Maas-
tricht effect (MAAST or MADE).  
Concerning the impact of trade openness on welfare expenditures, the 
literature leads to mitigated results. Trade openness and financial liberalization 
imply an increasing interdependence of fiscal policies. Particularly, capital mo-
                                                 
6 Moreover, if these individual effects represent proxies of not specified variables, they are likely 
to be correlated with the other explanatory variables. Lastly, as the countries included in the sam-
ple do not correspond to a random sample from a broader set of countries, the fixed effects model 
represents a suitable choice (Greene 2000). Social Protection Convergence in the European Union: Impact of Maastricht Treaty 
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bility could affect the size and the composition of government spending.  Ac-
cording to Tanzi (2000), the mobility of capital and income tax payers would 
reduce the fiscal autonomy of states. From this point of view, international eco-
nomic integration would threaten the social protection systems because the 
maintenance of generous social protection systems would impose a severe liabil-
ity for both the export and domestic sectors in a more competitive environment
7.  
However, international economic integration can cause an opposite ef-
fect. Rodrik (1998) shows that the more economies are open to trade, the more 
they would be exposed to external shocks and therefore the individuals would 
require more social protection in order to be able to secure shocks
8.  
With the exception of the study by Ringe (2004), which only studies the 
determinants of the level of social protection expenditure, the influence of the 
Maastricht effect was not tested in the studies of social convergence. According 
to the literature, one should expect a negative effect. Indeed, the criteria of 
Maastricht constitute a budgetary constraint, a common objective to ensure the 
suitable functioning of the Monetary Union. They can be used as instruments for 
fiscal consolidation implying a withdrawal of the Welfare state in Europe. Rotte 
and Zimmermann (1998) show that the Member States of the EU would have 
used the popularity of the European idea to reinforce fiscal discipline despite 
rising unemployment and declining growth rates. The authors use the term of 
"Europeanization" of tax policy.  On the other hand, Von Hagen and Strauch 
(2001) showed that the probability of implementation of fiscal consolidation 
would be dependent on the initial economic conditions. In particular, the impor-
tance of the initial debt constitutes a significant determinant of both the likeli-
hood of consolidation and the form and quality of the fiscal adjustments
9.  
Thus, in order to measure the Maastricht effect, we introduce a dummy 
variable which takes a value of 0 in the case of the absence of adhesion to the 
criteria and 1 starting from the date when the Maastricht criteria were in effect 
                                                 
7 Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo (2001) highlight a negative effect of trade openness on social se-
curity expenditure and a positive relation between the liberalization of capital, expenditures for/on 
health and education in a panel of 14 Latin American countries over the period 1973-1997.In the 
same way, according to the study by Garett and Mitchell (2001), trade openness would have re-
duced the size of the public sector, public consumption and transfers in 18 OECD countries over 
the period 1961-1983. 
8 Using different arguments and globalization indicators, other studies support the existence of a 
positive relation between globalization and social protection: Garett (1998), Hicks and Swank 
(1992) and Quinn (1997). 
9 The relationship between the initial level of debt and the quality of fiscal adjustment was clari-
fied in a certain number of studies, in particular, in the study by Bertola and Drazen (1993). In the 
same way, according to Dalagamas (1993), in the countries characterized by very high debt ratio 
levels, the citizens are more informed on the consequences of expansionary fiscal policies and 
accept more fiscal conservatism.  Nicole Attia and Valérie Berenger 
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(since 1993)
10 . Insofar as one of the criteria of convergence relates to the level 
of the national debt, we build a multiplicative dummy variable (MADE) which 
corresponds to the product of the lagged variation of the national debt (ΔDEBT(-
1)) and the dummy variable (MAAST), which will make it possible to appreciate 
the marginal effect of a variation of the debt before and after the implementation 
of Maastricht criteria. 
  Contrary to the majority of studies which organize panel of data into 
five year sub-periods, our estimates use annual data. In order to highlight the 
impact of the other factors controlling for steady state, we consider several 
specifications presented by decreasing degree of restriction. Thus, model A is 
the most parsimonious specification as it includes only the specific dummy vari-
ables for each country and the lagged endogenous variable. Model B adds the 
internal determinants of the growth of social protection expenditure to model A. 
Lastly, model C supplements the preceding specification by taking into account 
the factors related to the international integration of the economies.  
After a first round of estimates using Pooled OLS and fixed effects 
model, the analysis of the error structure by the standard tests reveals the pres-
ence of non-spherical errors. Thus, the likelihood test for groupwise heterosce-
dasticity results in rejecting the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity. In the same 
way, the test of Breusch-Pagan led to the acceptance of contemporaneous corre-
lation between residuals. Lastly, the test of Wooldridge for the autocorrelation 
indicates the residuals are first-order correlated. In order to correct the structure 
of the error terms, two procedures are proposed in the literature. The first is the 
Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS), a method adjusting for a panel-
specific AR(1) process. However, Beck and Katz (1995) showed that the FGLS 
tended to over-estimate the significance of the coefficients and that their asymp-
totic properties were not checked for small finite samples in time as well as in 
cross-sectional dimensions
11. Also, the second procedure panel-corrected stan-
dard errors procedure (PCSE) consists in correcting the standard deviations of 
the estimated parameters by using Prais-Winsten correction. We apply these two 
procedures in order to test the robustness of our model. Tables 3 and 4 display 
the results obtained for our two dependent variables: SPGDP and SPCAP by ap-
plying (PCSE)
12. In the various specifications, the coefficient β is statistically 
significant and has the expected sign. It confirms that conditional convergence is 
                                                 
10 Variable MAAST admits a zero value over the overall period considered for Denmark and the 
United Kingdom. 
11 FGLS requires that the number of observations in time dimension (T) be significantly larger 
than the number of cross-section units (N). Beck and Katz (1995) propose the PCSE estimator 
when the data generating process is characterized by heteroscedasticity and correlation (contempo-
raneous and serial). They claim that PCSE estimator is more efficient than the FGLS one when T 
is smaller than N. 
12 These results are not very different from the ones resulting from the use of FGLS except for 
significance levels. Results are available upon request from the authors. Social Protection Convergence in the European Union: Impact of Maastricht Treaty 
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checked for all the 12 countries in the sample. Coefficients of dummy variables 
by country (tables 3 and 4) reveal that the countries converge towards relatively 
similar stationary states in term of SPCAP because only some countries deviate 
from the steady growth path borrowed by the others. On the other hand, SPGDP 
presents a more significant number of statistically significant dummy variables 
(in particular in the model C) indicating a greater diversity of the stationary 
states towards which the social protection systems converge. This result suggests 
that the countries do not converge in terms of SPGDP towards a single model of 
social protection but follow trajectories characterized by the same speed of con-
vergence towards their own steady state.  
In model B, the simultaneous inclusion of ΔGDP and ΔUNEM yields 
non significant results for one of the two variables, a result which can be due to 
their colinearity. Several preliminary estimates lead us to exclude from model 
ΔUNEM in SPCAP and ΔGDP in SPGDP specifications. In all the cases, the 
rate of variation of the dependency ratio [ΔRD(-1)] carry a positive sign and has 
a strong significant incidence on the welfare expenditure growth. 
The result is what one might expect insofar as the increase in this ratio takes into 
account both the pressure due to demographic aging and that related to the de-
cline of the fertility rate which represents a common challenge which the major-
ity of the European countries must face. The increase in this ratio acts with the 
rise of the expenditures related to old-age and health which represent the princi-
pal component of social protection expenditure. In addition, this result confirms 
the assumptions of the theory of the median voter. In the same way, the coeffi-
cient of the unemployment rate (ΔUNEM) is positive and significant, which is 
justified easily insofar as, by the means of the automatic stabilizers, the needs for 
social transfers are sensitive to the state of the economic situation.Nicole Attia and Valérie Berenger 
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Table 3. Test of conditional β-convergence for per capita social protection ex-
penditure 
Dependent variable : ΔLNSPCAP  
PCSE A  B  C 
   1  2 
Intercept 
 
LNSPCAP(-1) 
 
ΔDR(-1) 
 
ΔUNEM 
 
ΔGDP 
 
 
OPEN 
 
MAAST 
 
MADE 
 
ΔDEBT(-1) 
 
 
DUMMIES 
COUNTRIES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
2 
Wald chi2(k) 
Nber obs. 
0.283*** 
[4.68] 
-0.032*** 
[-4.30] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.024**L 
[3.41] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.14 
26.47*** 
240 
0.420*** 
[5.91] 
-0.049*** 
[-5.61] 
1.05*** 
[3.48] 
 
 
0.15* 
[1.88] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.013** DK 
[2.00] 
0.012**F 
[2.64] 
0.012*I 
[1.87] 
0.026***L 
[3.69] 
 
0.17 
40.95*** 
228 
0.410*** 
[5.60] 
-0.042*** 
[-4.91] 
1.01*** 
[3.48] 
 
 
0.157* 
[1.90] 
 
-0.013** 
[-2.56] 
-0.005 
[-0.86] 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.035***L 
[4.15] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.21 
64.02*** 
228 
0.521*** 
[3.79] 
-0.037* 
[-1.86] 
0.544* 
[1.75] 
 
 
0.193** 
[2.25] 
 
-0.047* 
[-1.85] 
 
 
-0.224* 
[-1.80] 
-0.082 
[-1.18] 
 
-0.051** E 
[-2.02] 
0.048*** L 
[3.54] 
 
 
 
 
 
0.23 
63.77*** 
228 
Note: Variables are expressed in log except for MAAST and DEBT.  In brackets are the 
Z-statistics for each coefficient with robust standard deviations to the heteroscedasticity 
and the correlation of the errors.  The Wald test indicates if the specifications carried 
out are overall significant.  (***), (**) and (*) denote significance at 1%, 5% et 10% 
respectively. Social Protection Convergence in the European Union: Impact of Maastricht Treaty 
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Table 4. Test of conditional β-convergence for social protection expenditure as 
a share of GDP 
Dependent variable : ΔLNSPGDP 
PCSE  A B C 
     1  2 
Intercept 
 
LNSPGDP(-1) 
 
ΔDR(-1) 
 
ΔUNEM 
 
ΔGDP 
 
 
OPEN 
 
MAAST 
 
MADE 
 
ΔDEBT(-1) 
 
DUMMIES 
COUNTRIES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
2 
Wald chi2(k) 
Nber obs. 
0.314** 
[2.87] 
-0.094** 
[-2.89] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.049**IRL 
[-2.79] 
[-0.025**L 
[-1.99] 
 
 
 
 
 
0.20 
34.61 
240 
0.302** 
[2.57] 
-0 .091** 
 [-2.61] 
0.711** 
[2.48] 
0.136*** 
[6.34] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.014* DK 
[1.66] 
-0.028**L 
[-2.42]  
-0.037**IRL 
[-2.40] 
0.015* PB 
[1.79] 
 
0.32 
74.54*** 
228 
0.616*** 
[3.46] 
-0.099** 
[-2.67] 
0.606* 
[1.88] 
0.110*** 
[4.68] 
 
 
 
-0.068** 
[-2.67] 
0.001 
[0.22] 
 
 
 
 
 
NR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.337 
91.26*** 
228 
0.603*** 
[4.13] 
-0.090** 
[-2.55] 
0.668** 
[2.12 
0.116*** 
[4.83] 
-0.073** 
[-3.34] 
 
-0.072*** 
[-3.28] 
 
 
-0.028* 
[-1.84] 
0.003 
[0.05] 
 
NR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.36 
99.42*** 
228 
Note: NR indicates that the coefficients of dummies are not reported for reasons of space 
because these variables are mainly significant except for L and P. Nicole Attia and Valérie Berenger 
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 However, the low value of this coefficient compared to that of the de-
pendency ratio indicates that the growth rate of SPGDP is less sensitive to the 
overall economic situation than the structural one. Lastly, the growth rate of 
GDP (ΔGDP) has a positive incidence on the growth of SPCAP confirming the 
pursuit of Wagner’s Law for social welfare and not the reach of an upper limit of 
government size. Lastly, in model C, whatever the indicator being studied, con-
ditional convergence is checked, but the inclusion of OPEN and MAAST or 
MADE reduce the speed of convergence for SPCAP (from -0.049 to -0.042 with 
MAAST and to -0.035 with MADE) and stabilize it for SPGDP around -0.09. 
The negative and statistically significant coefficient of OPEN tends to support 
empirically the hypothesis that market integration puts a downward pressure on 
the welfare state. In a context of increasing international openness, welfare ex-
penditures are regarded more as production costs than as growth promoters. Al-
though economic globalization can enhance demands for social transfers accord-
ing to Rodrik (1998), our results show that international competitive pressures 
seem to outweigh the potential impetus rising from further development of social 
policies. The impact of MAAST is not significant whatever the indicator se-
lected. On the other hand, the Maastricht effect expressed by the variable MADE 
indicates, for the two indicators, that if the variation of the debt does not have 
any impact before 1993, its influence becomes negative and significant after that 
date. Thus, this result confirms that adhesion to Maastricht criteria probably led 
politician decision makers to implement fiscal consolidation programs causing a 
slowdown in social expenditure expansion. All in all, the findings are consistent 
with the existence of effective tensions between globalization and national social 
policy autonomy.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The main purpose of this paper was to study the dynamics of social protection 
expenditure in European Union by questioning the existence of social conver-
gence process between EU-countries and the incidence of the Maastricht Treaty 
on this process. 
Several convergence hypotheses were tested on 12 EU-Member States 
over the period 1980-2000 by focusing on two indicators capturing social ex-
penditure from two different perspectives.  
Cross-sectional tests of σ and β−convergence give evidence that a social 
convergence process, both in SPDGP and SPCAP, occurred over the whole pe-
riod. On the other hand, the period division into two sub-periods intended to lo-
cate the Maastricht effect indicates a rupture since 1993. Convergence in terms 
of means (SPGDP) still seems a fragile process strongly subjected to various Social Protection Convergence in the European Union: Impact of Maastricht Treaty 
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constraints. In contrast, the catching-up pattern of SPCAP, i.e., in terms of the 
well-being of the population is characterized by slow but more regular growth.  
In order to highlight the impact of the Maastricht Treaty, the hypothesis 
of conditional convergence was tested using panel data.  The results confirm the 
existence of a process of conditional convergence and exhibit particularly the 
significant negative influence of the degree of openness and the debt Maastricht 
criterion on the growth rate of social protection expenditure. In addition, these 
factors reduce the speed of convergence for SPCAP; the debt criterion becomes 
significant only after 1993. Whereas countries converge towards relatively simi-
lar steady states, SPGDP indicates a greater diversity of the stationary states. 
Our results give evidence of absolute and conditional convergence patterns over 
the whole period. This finding is not contradictory but suggests that the countries 
converge in fact towards parallel stationary states evoking the possible idea of a 
“European Social Snake” rather than of a single social model. 
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